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Abstract 
Monetary policy involves a dual role as central banks must not only be a heedful observer of outcomes 
but must also be able to shape the outcomes. In view of this, greater policy transparency has been 
endorsed to boost credibility, effectiveness and flexibility of monetary policy. With more than a decade of 
practicing of fully-fledged IT regime, it is of paramount interest to ascertain the pace of policy 
transparency in Ghana. Consequently, this paper determines the extent of policy transparency in Bank of 
Ghana, utilizing both methodologies of Dincer and Eichengreen (2008) and Al-Mashat and others (2018). 
The application of the two transparency measures reveals that policy transparency environment of Bank 
of Ghana (BOG) has indeed improved since 2009. Our score suggests that monetary policy in Ghana is 
41% -57% transparent as at end 2018. The relatively moderate score for BOG emanated largely from low 
level of transparency about its policy framework (FPAS model) and the procedural policy processes. To 
further boost transparency, BOG is required to increase transparency in the documentation and 
publication of the Bank‘s core quarterly projection model, as well as evaluating and publishing how each 
decision on policy instrument or target are attained. Publication of other core variables (aside inflation) in 
the baseline forecasts and regular external evaluation of the policy framework along with public 
disclosure of the findings are necessary to boost policy transparency.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The pace of reforms in terms of institutional transparency has been exceptionally brusque over 
the past two decades. This wave has primarily been bolstered by the realization that central banks 
can enhance their credibility1 and effectiveness by having a more transparent policy 
environment. Accordingly, many central banks in recent years have deliberately move towards 
higher policy transparency, particularly since the inception of inflation targeting (IT) regime. 
Geraats (2008) simply defines transparency as the absence of information asymmetry. The 
growing trend towards greater policy transparency is driven by a number of factors. First, it is 
grounded on the recognition that increased policy transparency does not only enhance monetary 
policy effectiveness, flexibility and credibility but also perceived as a crucial component of 
accountability in the era of central bank independence (see Al-Mashat et al., 2018). Second, it is 
widely articulated that central bank independence is a means of shielding monetary authority 
from short-term political pressures. Central bank independence is thus recognized as an efficient 
way of dealing with the time-consistency problems that are often associated with discretionary 
policy (Dincer and Eichengreen, 2014). Policy transparency has accordingly been recognized as 
a best means through which the public can judge whether the actions and tactics of independent 
central bankers are consistent with their mandate. Thirdly, transparency is perhaps part of a 
broader trend to make government more responsive to the public – boosting the transparency and 
efficiency of government operations generally. Last but not the least, transparency enables 
markets to react quite easily to policy decisions. This is because policy decision from a more 
transparent central bank is less probable to come as a surprise to market participants (investors). 
Consequently, such policy changes are less prone to induce sharp oscillations in asset prices that 
cause financial distress.  
 
Other researchers are also of the view that certain restrictions on transparency are important for 
operational reasons. For instance, Issing (1999) argued that central banks should separate ‗the 
need to know‘ from ‗the need to understand‘ in the quest to pursuing higher transparency. As a 
result, central banks are urged to strive for optimal but not maximum transparency (see, Issing, 
2014). Besides, Morris and Shin (2002) assert that noisy public information could induce greater 
economic volatility as ﬁnancial markets focus on it to coordinate their actions. Faust and 
Svensson (2001) also argued that increased transparency makes the bank's reputation and 
credibility more sensitive to its actions. They further assert that even though full transparency of 
the central bank's intentions is generally socially beneficial, it is frequently worse for the bank. 
Geraats (2002) also provides a structured review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
consequences of transparency of monetary policy. He also proposed a distinction between 
uncertainty and incentive effects of transparency.  
 
Notwithstanding, greater policy transparency particularly hinges on the fact that monetary policy 
encompasses a dual role. This is because a central bank must not only be a heedful observer of 
outcomes but also be able to shape the outcomes. Therefore, the actions of central bank and the 
                                                          
1Gonzalez-Paramo (2007) professed credibility as a fundamental issue in modern central banking, while Blinder 
(1998, 2000) also deemed credibility as a treasurable asset that need to be seriously upheld by central banks. 
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information it publicly provides create a common powerful focal point for the information 
processing decisions of economic agents (Amato and Shin, 2003). The move toward greater 
policy transparency is a global phenomenon, outstanding examples are found in the Federal 
Reserve System in the US, The European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England and the 
Central Banks of Canada, New Zealand and Sweden. These notable central banks have deplored 
several ways to boost policy transparency, such as publication of inﬂation forecasts, far-reaching 
explanations of the reasoning behind their decisions, and publication of voting records on policy 
decisions or a discussion of the ‗bias‘ in those decisions.  
 
In line with this wave, IT central banks in emerging and developing economies (including 
Ghana) have equally allocated substantial resources and effort (with the help of IMF) to enhance 
transparency in their policy environment. Indeed, such deliberate policy direction toward higher 
transparency has also been realized in Ghana over the past decade, via series of policy 
publication and relative improved media presence by Bank of Ghana. This has been facilitated 
by the pursuit of Inflation Targeting Lite (ITL) immediately following the inauguration of the 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in September 2002. The central bank however formally 
shifted to a fully-fledged IT as a framework of monetary policy in May 20072. This policy shift 
made Ghana the second African country (after South Africa) but the first developing economy in 
the world to fully adopt IT regime. With more than decade of practicing of fully-fledged IT 
regime, it is therefore of paramount interest to ascertain the pace of policy transparency in 
Ghana.  
 
Against this background, this paper aims to quantitatively determine the degree of monetary 
policy transparency in Ghana, utilizing both methodologies of Dincer and Eichengreen (2007, 
henceforth DE) and Al-Mashat, Bulif, Dencer, Hledik, Holub, Kostanyan, Laxton, Nurbekyan, 
Portililo & Wang (2018), henceforth CBT-IT. Although the study by Naszodi, Csavas, Erhart & 
Felcser (2016) obtained a transparency index of 5.5 for Ghana as at end-2009 using Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2007, henceforth DE) approach, their index largely reflects the early years of fully-
fledged IT regime in Ghana (May 2007). In addition, their study reflects transparency that 
existed almost a decade ago and therefore not wholly representative of the contemporary 
monetary policy environment in Ghana. We further emphasize that considerable resources and 
policy efforts (including IMF support) have been devoted to enhancing monetary policy 
transparency in Ghana and therefore the degree of policy transparency would have changed since 
the time of their study. Besides, the limitation of DE approach calls for a more robust approach 
to evaluating the extent of policy transparency in Ghana as the central bank currently fits the 
criterion of an inflation-forecast-targeter.  
 
Our application of the two transparency measures (DE and CBT-IT) on Ghana reveals that policy 
transparency environment of BOG has indeed improved since 2009. The DE method yields 8.5 
score for Ghana (approximately 57%) for 2018 compared with the score of 5.5 (37%) reported 
by Nascodi et al., (2016) for 2009. In contrast, the CDT-IT method yields a transparency score of 
                                                          
2While some authors refer to the official announcement to date the official adoption of IT (see Kwakye, 2012, IMF, 
2014), Abradu-Otoo et al. (2003) assert that even though formal announcement was made in May 2007, Inflation 
Targeting was launched in the latter part of 2002. 
Measuring monetary policy transparency index for Ghana                                                        2019 
 
4 | P a g e  
 
8.1 (41%). Thus, the two methods show a current range of policy transparency score of 8.1 - 8.5 
for Ghana as at end 2018, suggesting that BOG is roughly 41% -57% transparent3 as at end 2018. 
The relatively moderate score for BOG emanated largely from low level of transparency about 
the FPAS and the policy processes which is consistent with poor performance of BOG within the 
Economic and Procedural thematic areas under the DE index. By implication, to further boost 
transparency, BOG is required to increase transparency in the following areas: (1) documentation 
and publication of the Bank‘s core quarterly projection model (FPAS) with key equations 
(especially the loss function); (2) provision of more information about how the BOG is dealing 
with the short-run sacrifice ratio (i.e. tradeoffs between output and inflation); (3) public access to 
the minutes from the MPC meetings with more detailed contributions by MPC members; (4) 
evaluating and publishing how each decision on policy instrument or target are attained; (5) 
Besides the fan chart for inflation that is regularly published in the monetary policy report, BOG 
should also consider publishing other core macroeconomic variables that are included in their 
baseline forecasts with confidence bands, risk assessments, and decomposition of forecast 
revisions; (6) the underlying methodology for constructing the forecast confidence bands should 
be clearly explained; (7) Regular review of forecasting performance of the central bank and 
made accessible to the public; (8) Continuous external evaluation of the policy framework and 
the FPAS at least every 5 years even when not under IMF program, and publishing the findings.  
 
The next section (Section 2) briefly highlights the practical architecture of the contemporary 
monetary policy framework in Ghana, while Section 3 provides the proposed measures of policy 
transparency that underpinned the method adopted in our study. Section 4 provides the empirical 
findings regarding the extent of monetary policy transparency in Ghana, while Section 5 
provides the concluding remarks. 
 
2. Stylized Facts on Monetary Policy in Ghana 
 
This section provides the stylized fact on monetary policy in Ghana with particular focus on the 
practical feature of the contemporary monetary policy regime.   
 
2.1. Evolution of Monetary Policy in Ghana 
 
Formal monetary policy in Ghana began with the enactment of the Bank of Ghana Act 1963 and 
the subsequent launch of credit control regulations in April 1964. This regulation guided the era 
of monetary policy through direct controls4 that was to persist throughout the 1980s to early 
1990s. The period was marked by stringent controls on interest rate, credit ceiling and directed 
lending at the bidding of the authorities rather than for commercial reasons, alongside capital and 
exchange rate controls. However, expansive monetary policy coerced by fiscal dominance 
(reflected by persistent monetary accommodation of fiscal expansion fueled by significant 
                                                          
3
 In contrast, Al-Mashat et al., (2018) derived a transparency score of 14.5 out of 15 and 11.5 out of 20 based on the 
DE and CBT-IT measures respectively for the Czech National Bank.   
4Direct controls refer to the one-to-one correspondence between the instrument (such as a credit ceiling) and the 
policy objective (such as specific amount of domestic credit outstanding). Direct instruments operate by setting or 
limiting either prices (interest rates) or quantities (amounts of credit outstanding) through regulation.  
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political interference in the operations of the central bank) led to an accelerated and volatile 
inflation in the late 1960s through to the early 1980s. The deteriorated monetary and fiscal 
conditions fostered inflation to reach a triple-digit by 19835 with an associated economic decline. 
According to Brownbridge and Gockel (1996), the financial sector policies were epitomized by 
severe financial repression, real interest rate steeply negative and most of the credit was directed 
to the public sector. 
 
The deplorable macroeconomic conditions coupled with the inability of the then financial system 
to deliver effective financial services culminated in the implementation of a comprehensive 
stabilization programme6 by October 1983, following a consultation with the IMF and the World 
Bank. A key component of the programs was the Financial Sector Adjustment Program 
(FINSAP)7. The FINSAP resulted in the removal of credit ceilings, abolishing directed credit 
and credit controls, development of the money and capital markets. The core policy initiatives 
under FINSAP were intended to transform into improved monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. This era was typified by monetary targeting regime with a dominant application of 
indirect policy instruments (i.e. use of monetary aggregates such as broad money growth, reserve 
requirements, etc.).  
 
Nevertheless, fiscal dominance continued to linger and this was perceived as a predominant 
factor in undermining the effectiveness of monetary policy in Ghana. Consequently, the 
lingering financial sector and fiscal challenges led to the launch of a second wave of financial 
sector reforms in 2001. The second reform was mainly aimed at addressing salient regulatory 
impediments and associated corporate governance issues in the entire financial structure. 
Accordingly, numerous laws were passed to enhance the institutional architecture of the 
financial system. Foremost among them is the enactment of the Bank of Ghana Act 2002, (Act 
612), which granted operational independence8 to BOG and established the Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC) with the responsibility of formulation and implementation of monetary 
policy. This Act thus initiated the shift from Monetary Targeting to Inflation Targeting (IT) 
regime in Ghana. 
 
2.2. Practical Architecture of IT Implementation in Ghana 
 
Ghana initially pursued Inflation Targeting Lite (ITL) with the inauguration of the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) in September 2002 and empowered by the enactment of the BOG Act 
2002 (Acts 612). The central bank however formally shifted to a fully-fledged IT as a framework 
                                                          
5Ghana recorded its highest inflation rate of 123% in 1983. 
6Economic Recovery (ERP) and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). 
7FINSAP included the liberalization of interest rates and abolition of directed credit, restructuring of financially 
distressed banks, strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory framework, the establishment of the Ghana Stock 
Exchange (GSE), and promotion of non-bank financial institutions. The foreign exchange market also witnessed 
progressive reforms, culminating in the floating of the exchange rate and the establishment of forex bureaus to help 
eliminate the parallel markets. 
8The BOG (Amendment) Act 2016 (Act 918), which is an act to amend the BOG Act 2002 (Act 612), was passed by 
Parliament and assented to by the President in August 19th, 2016. This amendment further strengthens the 
operational independence of BOG. 
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of monetary policy in May 20079. The policy shift made Ghana the second African country (after 
South Africa) but the first developing economy in the world to fully adopt IT. The IT is based on 
the notion that policy is designed to target inflation through an inflation forecast. Given that the 
inflation forecast is a function of many macroeconomic variables, policy reacts to a whole range 
of variables. The current IT framework is thus premised on the fact that inflation is not solely a 
monetary phenomenon, but other factors do influence prices.  
 
In this framework, the monetary policy tool of the BOG is the monetary policy rate (MPR), 
while the operating target is the overnight money market interest rate (Interbank rate). The MPR 
is the rate around which a policy corridor is defined for central bank‘s acceptance of deposit and 
granting of credit to commercial banks, reflecting a limited importance on monetary aggregates. 
However, for the monetary policy to have the desired impact on inflation (the prime objective) 
and the overall economy, it is critical that changes in policy interest rate affect the short run 
wholesale interest rate (e.g. overnight interbank rate) which in turn translates into changes in 
retail interest rates (e.g. lending and deposit rates) and ultimately influence the overall 
macroeconomy and inflation. Besides, the transmission of interest rate changes via the interest 
rate channel should preferably occur at a shorter period of time. This is based on the notion that 
faster transmission strengthens the impact of monetary policy on the real economy. 
Consequently, monetary policy effectiveness is often gauged by the ability and the speed with 
which the central bank continuously achieves the interest rate target.  
 
The main features that differentiate inflation targeting from other monetary policy strategies are: 
(i) the central bank is committed to a unique numerical target (level or ranges) for annual or 
medium-term inflation; (ii) the inflation forecast over some horizon is the de facto intermediate 
target; and (iii) an important role for transparency, accountability and communication with the 
public (see Martinez, 2008). In this regard, the ensuing sections succinctly bring to light key 
benchmarks for the implementation of IT regime in the Ghanaian context.  
 
 
2.2.1. Legal Objective and Target Autonomy  
 
As clearly acknowledged in the literature, an IT central bank is required to have a clearly defined 
objective of monetary policy. Although the policy objective of Bank of Ghana has not changed 
over the years despite shifting policy regimes, the enactment of BOG Act 2002 (Act 612) 
formally articulated the prime objective of the central bank of Ghana. In particular, the Section 3 
Subsection 1 of BOG Act 2002 (Act 612) stipulates that the prime (legal) objective of Bank of 
Ghana ―is to maintain stability in the general levels of prices‖. The subsequent Subsection 2 also 
promulgates that ―without prejudices to Subsection 1, the Bank shall support the general 
economic policy of the Government and promote economic growth and effective and efficient 
operation of banking and credit systems in the country, independent of instructions from 
Government or any other authority‖. The Bank‘s primary objective is clearly and easily 
                                                          
9While some authors refer to the official announcement to date the official adoption of IT (see Kwakye, 2012, IMF, 
2014), Abradu-Otoo et al. (2003) assert that even though formal announcement was made in May 2007, Inflation 
Targeting was launched in the latter part of 2002. 
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accessible at its website. Also required by the tenets of IT regime, the price stability objective 
has been explicitly and quantitatively enumerated as a medium-term inflation target of 8 percent 
with a symmetric band of 2 percent (i.e. 8±2%). The medium-term inflation target is jointly set 
by BOG and the fiscal authority, while the corresponding annual inflation target is 
communicated clearly to the public via the budget statement for each fiscal year. 
 
2.2.2. Central Bank Autonomy/Independence 
 
Likewise, central bank independence/autonomy is well articulated among the key tenets of IT 
regime. Granting independence to central bank implies that no established bodies, government, 
parliament or any of their respective members have the power to interfere in the decisions taken 
by the central bank in the performance of its mission or mandate, and overthrow the course of 
decisions taken. Therefore, central bank is deemed autonomous when it is free to implement 
monetary policy instrument(s) without taking into account of any external pressures. Table 1 
presents the extent of central bank of Ghana‘s autonomy as against selected emerging IT 
countries.  
 
Table 1: Degree of central bank autonomy for selected emerging IT economies  
Countries 
Approximate 
Date of 
Official 
Adoption 
Goal Autonomy 
Target 
Autonomy 
Instrument Autonomy 
Target Level 
Legal Objective Specification 
of Target 
Credit to 
Government 
Participation of 
Government 
Brazil 1999M6 Price Stability G No No 4% +/-1.5% 
Chile 1999M9 Price + Financial Stability CB Yes Member to vote 3%+/-1.0% 
Colombia 1999M9 Price Stability CB Non Member to vote 3%+/-1.0% 
Czech Republic 1997M12 Price Stability G+CB No No 2%+/-1.0% 
Ghana 2007M5 Price Stability G + CB Yes No 8% +/-2% 
Hungary 2001M6 Price Stability G+CB No No 3%+/-1.0% 
Indonesia 2005M7 Price Stability G+CB No No 4%+/-1.0% 
Israel 1997M6 Price Stability G No No 1.0%-3.0% 
Mexico 2001M1 Price Stability CB Yes yes 3%+/-1.0% 
Peru 2002M1 Monetary Stability CB No Member to vote 2%+/-1.0% 
Philippines 2002M1 Price Stability G+CB limited Member to vote 3%+/-1.0% 
Poland 1999M10 Price Stability CB No No 2.5%+/-1.0% 
Romania 2005M8 Price Stability G+CB No No 2.5%+/-1.0% 
Slovakia 2005M110 Price Stability CB No No 3%+/-1.0% 
South Africa 2000M2 Price Stability G + CB Yes No 3.0%-6.0% 
South Korea 2001M1 Price Stability G+CB Yes Yes 2.0%^ 
Thailand 2000M5 Monetary Stability CB Yes No 2.5%+/-1.5% 
Turkey 2006M1 Price Stability G+CB No No 5%+/-2.0% 
Note: G is Government; CB is Central Bank; ^ denotes target for 2016-18. Source: Central Banks‘ website, 
Svensson (2010) and Aguir (2018) 
 
Consistently with the IT tenets, the BOG Act 2002 (Act 612) grants the BOG the operational 
independence to set interest rates, its dominant policy instrument under the IT regime. The 
operational independence of the Bank is further strengthened by the enactment of BOG 
(Amendment) Act 2016 (Act 918) which provides an insertion of new Subsection A1 into 
Section 4 of the principal enactment of Act 612. Box 1 below provides the insertion in the BOG 
2002 Act (Act 612). 
                                                          
10
 But according to Krusec (2011), Slovakia was an implicit inflation targeter in beginning of 1999. 
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Box 1: Section 3 of BOG (Amendment) Act 2016 (Act 918) 
Section 4 of Act 612 amended 
3. The principal enactment is amended in section 4 by the insertion of a new subsection (1A) 
―(1A) Except as provided in the Constitution, the Bank of Ghana, in the performance of its function under 
this Act, shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority‖  
  
In terms of membership, The MPC comprises of seven (7) members – five (5) from the BOG and 
two (2) external members (see Box 2). Initially, by the BOG 2002 Act (Act 612) the two external 
members were appointed by government (via the Minister of Finance). However, following the 
enactment of BOG Amendment Act 2016 (Act 918), the external members are now appointed by 
the Board of Directors of BOG (see Section 14 of the BOG Amendment Act 2016, Act 918), 
reinforcing the operational independence of the central bank.  The Governor of the central bank 
is the chairperson of the committee. The MPC meets six (6) times in a year. If the target is not 
achieved, the Bank of Ghana is not strictly accountable by law to explain developments to the 
Ministry of Finance or Parliament. 
 
Box 2: Section 14 of BOG (Amendment) Act 2016 (Act 918) 
Section 27 of Act 612 amended 
    14. The principal enactment is amended by the substitution for section 27 of  
          ―Monetary Policy Committee 
   27. (1) There is established by this Act, a committee of the Bank to be known as Monetary Policy 
Committee. 
         (2) The Monetary Policy Committee is responsible for the formulation of the Monetary Policy of the 
Bank. 
                      (3) The members of the Monetary Policy Committee comprise 
   (a) the Governor, 
   (b) the First and Second Deputy Governors, 
 (c) the head of the Department responsible for economic research of the   Bank 
 (d) the head of the Department responsible for Treasury Operations of the Bank, and 
 (e) two other persons with knowledge and experience which is relevant to the function of the 
Monetary Policy Committee, appointed by the Board who are not employee of the Bank. 
        (4) The members of the Monetary Policy Committee other than the employees of the Bank shall be 
paid the allowance determined by the Board. 
 
The MPC, during its bi-monthly monetary policy decision-making, autonomously evaluates the 
latest BOG forecasts and appraises the imminent threats to the forecast over the medium-term. 
Similar to other IT central banks, the MPC reviews developments in inflation, the global 
economy, the real sector, the monetary sector, the fiscal sector, the external sector, consumer and 
business sentiments and inflation expectations. Contingent on these considerations, the MPC 
votes on whether and by how much to change the settings of monetary policy instruments. The 
Committee‘s decisions are made on the basis of one-person one-vote. Each member 
unambiguously states with explanations why a particular rate decision was desired or otherwise, 
and the final policy decision is reached by consensus. 
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2.2.3. Transparency and Accountability 
 
Transparency simply means honesty and openness, in an organizational (business or 
government) context. Notably, transparency and accountability are commonly regarded as the 
two core pillars of good corporate governance. Indeed, transparency and accountability have a 
natural interpretation as strategic moves that improve the signal-to-noise ratio and therefore 
empower economic agents to make a better-informed allocation of resources (Capistran and 
Ramos-Francia, 2010). In addition, better communication between the monetary authority and 
economic agents could lead to less dispersion of expectations, reducing the variance in relative 
prices which can in turn reduce the level of inflation (Ball and Mankiw, 1995). Conceivably, 
some of the cost of nominal movements in the economy may be related to the dispersion of 
inflation expectation (Lucas, 1972) while a fall in dispersion may enhance the effectiveness of 
the expectations channel of monetary transmission (Martinez, 2008). Accordingly, many 
economists opined that central banks can enhance their credibility11 by having a transparent 
policy environment that is purposely designed to achieve long-term price stability. 
 
Consequently, the central bank‘s primary objective of being transparent is to effectively facilitate 
the bank to tie economic agents‘ expectation to its own policy objectives. Since transparency 
boosts policy effectiveness and credibility, the Bank of Ghana considers effective policy 
communication, transparency and accountability as the major drivers to shape economic agents‘ 
formation of inflation expectation in Ghana. This has led the central bank to bestow considerable 
resources and determination to improve their transparency.  
 
We find that the BOG first and foremost pre-announced and published on its website all the six 
policy meetings dates and times at the beginning of the year. The public is also reminded of the 
upcoming MPC meeting at least two weeks before the meeting date. Secondly, at the end of all 
meetings, the policy decision is immediately announced and explained at a press briefing 
(conference). Thirdly, the press release (policy decision), the transcript12 of the press briefing 
with the Q&A sessions, the Summary of Economic and Financial Dataset as well as MPC 
Infographics (highlights of the Press Release) are made available on the Bank‘s website 
immediately after the press briefing. These policy documents are available in downloadable form 
in English. The summary of Financial and Economic Datasets is also available in downloaded 
PDF format. 
 
Fourth, the Monetary Policy Report is published at the Bank‘s website within two weeks after 
the MPC meeting, providing detailed analysis of economic conditions at the time of the meeting. 
The report encompasses broad areas such as: world economic outlook and external sector report, 
                                                          
11Gonzalez-Paramo (2007) professed credibility as a fundamental issue in modern central banking, while Blinder 
(1998, 2000) also deemed credibility as a treasurable asset that need to be seriously upheld by central banks. 
12
 The transcript of the Press briefing provides the questions asked by the Press and corresponding responses by the 
Governor during the press conference after the MPC meetings. 
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monetary and financial developments, financial stability report, real sector developments, and an 
inflation analysis and outlook. Particularly, the report clearly provides the imminent risks to 
inflation and output over the short to medium terms alongside an inflation fan chart. Fifth, a 
detailed Banking Sector Report (BSR) which highlights developments and risks in the banking 
sector deliberated upon during the policy making process is further published after the MPC 
meetings.  
 
Last but not the least, Ghana in 2018 has implemented the IMF‘s Enhanced General Data 
Dissemination System (e-GDDS) by establishing a National Summary Data Page (NSDP) that is 
linked to e-GDDS (see, IMF‘s Press Release No. 18/421). The NSDP is a one-stop national data 
portal to publish crucial macroeconomic data on the national accounts, government operations 
and debt, monetary and financial sector, and BOP, among other. Utilizing the Statistical Data and 
Metadata Exchange, the NSDP is in both human and machine-readable formats. Hosted by the 
Ghana‘s Minister of Finance and Economic Development (MOFEP), the NSDP contains links to 
statistics published by Bank of Ghana, Ghana Statistical Services and MOFEP. The 
establishment of NSDP would help inure greater data transparency as it proffers simultaneous 
access to timely information critical for monitoring economic conditions and policies by 
domestic and international policymakers and shareholders including investors and rating 
agencies. 
 
Notwithstanding, the Bank has so far not provided a number of documents to the general public. 
Particularly, the minutes of the MPC meetings are not yet made available to the general public. 
Although, MPC decision is based on consensus, the publication of the minutes with detailed 
illustration of each member‘s decision regarding the positioning of the interest rate would shape 
economic agent‘s formation of inflation expectation. In addition, there are neither official 
documentations nor working papers regarding the forecasting framework (FPAS), the loss 
function as well as the medium-term forecast of key variable such as policy interest rate, output 
gap and exchange rate paths at the Bank‘s website. The ensuing policy question is: does the lack 
of publication of these policy documents significantly affect the degree of transparency and 
effectiveness of IT regime in Ghana? This is the focus of this paper. 
 
3. Proposed Measures of Policy Transparency  
 
Understanding and documenting the level of monetary policy transparency requires better 
measures of central bank transparency. Geraats (2002) provides a structured review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the consequences of transparency of monetary policy. He 
also proposed a distinction between uncertainty and incentive effects of transparency.  
 
Several theoretical and empirical approaches have also been proposed to quantify the degree of 
central bank policy transparency. Notable studies that have developed indices for policy 
transparency include Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger & Sterne (2000), Siklos (2002), Eijﬃnger 
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and Geraats (2006), Dincer and Eichengreen (2007, 2010, 2014), Naszodi et al (2016) and Al-
Mashat et al., (2018). For instance, Fry et al. (2000) gauged central bank transparency of ninety-
four (94) countries using an evenly weighted average of three sub-indicators: (1) whether the 
central bank provides prompt public explanations of its policy decisions; (2) the frequency and 
form of forward-looking analysis offered to the public; and (3) the frequency of bulletins, 
speeches, and research papers. Siklos (2002) also provided comparable measures for twenty 
OECD countries but again for only one point in time, the late 1990s. The main limitation of both 
studies is the crude definition of transparency.  
 
In view of this limitation, Eijﬃnger and Geraats (2006), henceforth EG, provided a much 
broader definition of transparency by focusing on disclosure of information pertinent to 
monetary policymaking. They categorize transparency into the following five dimensions: (1) 
political transparency (openness about policy objectives); (2) economic transparency (openness 
about data, models, and forecasts); (3) procedural transparency (openness about the way 
decisions are made, achieved mainly through the release of minutes and votes); (4) policy 
transparency (openness about the policy implications, achieved through prompt announcement 
and explanation of decisions); and (5) operational transparency (openness about the 
implementation of those decisions—in other words, about control errors and macroeconomic 
disturbances aﬀecting their magnitude). Their index covered 9 major central banks from 1998 to 
2002. They found that although significant increases are observed for all monetary policy 
regimes, the inflation targeting central banks are by far the most transparent.  
 
Dincer and Eichengreen (2007, henceforth DE) further extended the EG (2006) transparency 
index to 100 central banks. According to DE (2014), political transparency relates to formal 
policy objective, quantification of objective and central bank independence, while economic 
transparency borders on disclosure of the model used for policy analysis, regular publication of 
central bank‘s forecast and easy access to basic economic data relevant for the conduct of 
monetary policy. The Procedural transparency pertains to the Bank‘s explicit disclosure of policy 
rule, provision of a comprehensive account of policy deliberation and how each decision on 
policy instrument or target are attained. Policy Transparency relates to prompt public notification 
and explanation of policy decision and the likely future policy action. Lastly, the Operational 
transparency also pertains to regular evaluation of policy target, provision of information on 
macroeconomic shocks that affect the policy transmission process as well as evaluation of policy 
outcome vis-à-vis its macroeconomic objectives. Applying similar classification of transparency, 
a number of empirical studies (notably, Chortareas, Stasavage and Sterne 2002; Crowe and 
Meade, 2008; Demertzis and Hallett, 2007; Dincer and Eichengreen, 2014; Ehrmann, Eijﬃnger 
and Fratzscher, 2012; Middeldorp, 2011; Naszodi et al., 2016; Swanson, 2004; inter alia) claim 
that central bank transparency has a favorable eﬀect on the economy. In contrast, some other 
papers (notably, Demertzis and Hoeberichts, 2007; Kool, Middeldorp, & Rosenkranz, 2011; 
Morris and Shin, 2002; Neuenkirch, 2013; van der Cruijsen, Eijffinger, & Hoogduin, 2010; and 
Walsh 2007) however find either that higher transparency is unfavorable or has a nebulous eﬀect 
on mitigating macroeconomic uncertainty.  
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Another notable contribution is the study by Naszodi et al (2016) which proposed composite EG 
transparency index to 99 central banks (including Ghana) over the period 1998-2009. They rank 
the countries according to the degree of policy transparency using both the standard EG-DE 
index and a proposed composite EG index which aggregates the same ﬁfteen components of the 
EG-DE method. The composite transparency index is obtained by regressing standard deviation 
of the individual CPI forecasts on each of the 15 components of EG index. They also determine 
which of dimension of transparency that exerts significant impact on macroeconomic variable 
(forecast inflation dispersion). Among others, they derive an index of 5.5 and 0.67 for Ghana 
based on the standard and weighted EG transparency measures respectively, ranking the latter 
economy as the 44 position (out of 97 countries considered). They also find that economic 
transparency has the robust favourable effect on inflation forecast dispersion. 
 
Nonetheless, the EG (2006) and DE (2007, 2014) transparency measures have been criticized for 
lacking sufficient depth on advanced forms of communications, especially for the inflation-
forecasting-targeting (IFT) countries. First, it becomes practically cumbersome to discriminate 
between different IFT countries and between IFT and non-IFT countries, since all IFT countries 
attain near maximum score of the EG-DE index. In addition, the EG-DE questions do not capture 
transparent communication of monetary and macro-prudential policy interactions despite the 
increasing importance of financial stability and macro-prudential policies after the global 
financial crisis (see, Al-Mashat et al., 2018). Consequently, Al-Mashat et al., (2018) proposed 
new transparency index (henceforth, CBT-IT index) for inflation-forecast-targeting central banks 
which overcomes the shortcomings of EG-DE index. Based on the theoretical underpinnings of 
IFT framework, the CBT-IT index focuses on three broad categories: (1) transparency about 
policy objectives, (2) transparency about the Forecasting and Policy Analysis System (FPAS), 
and (3) transparency about the policy process. The CBT-IT index offers more detailed scrutiny 
about the practice of central bank compare to the EG-DE index.  
 
The questions on the ―Transparency about policy objectives‖ explore the transparency of the 
central bank along the following 4 dimensions: 
 Statement of the objective 
 Clear communication of those objectives 
 Communication of performance of the central bank in terms of managing the short-run 
tradeoffs between output and inflation (sacrifice ratio), and 
 The role of financial stability in monetary policy communication 
 
The questions related to the ―Transparency about the FPAS‖ category appraise the robustness 
and public awareness of the FPAS process adopted by the central bank based on the following 9 
scopes: 
 Publication of historical and forecast datasets used in policy decision making within the 
FPAS 
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 Publication of loss/reaction function (with the coefficients) and communicating the 
judgment that has been involved on the forecast. 
 Publication of fan charts for all key macroeconomic variables (including inflation, GDP 
growth, output gap, endogenous interest rate path and exchange rate)  
 Publication of underlying methodology for the construction of fan charts as it increases 
the value of the information for the users. 
 Publication of alternative scenarios as it helps users to decipher a couple of potential risks 
in the baseline forecast. 
 Clear indication of how the policy rate might response should any of the speculated shock 
materialize 
 Publication of forecast revisions of the full set of both historical and forecasted macro-
variables; and 
 Indicating how much attention is given to measures of financial conditions in the 
monetary policy reports. 
 
Lastly, the questions concerning the ―Transparency about Policy Process‖ uniquely examine the 
central bank policy process along the following 7 aspects: 
 Holding press conference soon after every policy meeting and at pre-announced date and 
time. 
 Webcasting Press conference and Q&A session and the transcripts (in English) made 
available at the bank‘s website 
 Organizing regular meetings with market analyst to clearly explain the assumptions 
underpinning policy decisions. 
 Regular presentation of forecast update (including Q&A sessions) to journalist, market 
analyst and participants.  
 Publication of minutes of detailed contribution of each MPC member during the meeting 
 Clearly defining the role of staff and policymakers in the decision-making process 
 Allowing external and independent evaluation of the policy framework and the FPAS 
every 5 years.   
 
For brevity, readers are referred to Al-Mashat et al (2018) for the justification of each question 
under the broad categories of the CBT-IT index. The proposed CBT-IT index was applied to 
Czech National Bank (CNB). They derive a policy transparency index of 11.5 for CNB based on 
the CBT-IT methodology in 2018. The study also finds that the transparency of CNB is growing 
over the years but there are areas that should be improved (see Al-Mashat et al., 2018). 
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis of Policy Transparency in Ghana 
 
This section presents the current state of monetary policy transparency in Ghana using both DE 
and CBT-IT methodologies.   
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4.1 Transparency Index for Bank of Ghana: CBT-IT Approach  
 
In this section, we ascertain Ghana‘s policy transparency score by using the newly developed 
transparency index for inflation-targeting central banks (CBT-IT index) by Al-Mashat et al., 
(2018) which overcomes the shortcomings of DE index. Basically, the CBT-IT index hinges on 
three main categories. In this study, Category A denotes transparency about policy objectives. 
Category B focuses transparency about the Forecasting and Policy Analysis System (FPAS), 
while Category C represents transparency about the policy process. Appendix A3 provides the 
CBT-IT questions, scoring system for the index and our score for BOG. We proceed in the 
subsequent paragraph to justify each transparency score. The score for BOG in this paper is 
solely contingent on information provided at the Bank‘s website and statutes, annual reports, 
other published documents and the routine procedures as well as events (at least two weeks) 
before and after (at most one month) policy meetings. 
 
In Category A, the transparency about policy objectives has 4 dimensions. The first dimension 
borders on clear statement of policy objectives. A perfect score is attained if Inflation is the 
primary objective such that any other objective (output, etc.) cannot be inconsistent with the 
primary objective of anchoring inflation and inflation expectations. In this case, BOG has a 
perfect score (1/1) because the Section 3 Subsection 1 of the Bank of Ghana Act 2002 (Act 612) 
clearly stipulates that the primary objective of the BOG is to maintain price stability. This core 
objective of monetary policy can also be found at the bank‘s website. In addition, the second 
dimension of Category A ascertains whether there is a clearly defined inflation target.  We find 
that BOG has a clearly defined the medium-term inflation target of 8% with a symmetric band of 
2% and this information is easily accessible at the bank‘s website. The clarity and publicity of 
inflation target also gives a perfect score (1/1) for BOG regarding clear communication of the 
objective under Category A. The third dimension of question under Category A concerns the 
communication of performance of the central bank in terms of managing the short-run tradeoffs 
between output and inflation (sacrifice ratio). A thorough review of press releases and transcripts 
at the bank‘s website reveals that there is no official or policy document on loss function that is 
easily accessible to the public. Consequently, we score zero (0) for BOG on the question relating 
to publicity of its loss function. The next question under category A focuses on the role of 
financial stability in monetary policy communication. In this case, it first ascertains whether 
another institution is responsible for financial stability. A perfect score is attained when central 
bank cares about financial stability to the extent that it affects stabilization objectives (output and 
unemployment), and makes it clear that inflation is the primary objective. The leg of the last 
dimension also determines whether the central bank is at least partly responsible for financial 
stability. In both case, we give a perfect score (2/2) to BOG as financial stability mandate of 
BOG besides the prime objective of price stability is well articulated in the Section 3 Subsection 
1 & 2 of the BOG Act 2002 and amendment Act 2016 (Act 612 and 918 respectively). The 
Section 3 Subsection 1 of the Act 612 stipulates that the prime (legal) objective of Bank of 
Measuring monetary policy transparency index for Ghana                                                        2019 
 
15 | P a g e  
 
Ghana ―is to maintain stability in the general levels of prices‖. The Subsection 2 promulgates 
that ―without prejudices to Subsection 1, the Bank shall support the general economic policy of 
the Government and promote economic growth and effective and efficient operation of banking 
and credit systems in the country, independent of instructions from Government or any other 
authority‖. Accordingly, the BOG is the sole regulator of the banking system to ensure financial 
stability. Various macro-prudential benchmarks for each segment of the banking system are 
provided and systemic stress tests are carried out by relevant departments of the Bank. For 
instance, the link for the BOG‘s financial laws for the Banking sector can be found at BOG‘s 
website13. Also, the mandate of BOG is clearly stated at its website as ―We formulate and 
implement monetary policy to achieve price stability, contribute to the promotion and 
maintenance of financial stability, and ensure a sound payment system‖ (see, 
www.bog.gov.gh).On aggregate, our total score for BOG in Category A is 4/5, implying that 
BOG has done pretty well by clearly and satisfactorily articulating its policy objectives to the 
general public. 
 
In Category B, the transparency about the FPAS also has nine (9) dimensions. The first 
dimension (i.e. B1) determines public accessibility to basic economic data relevant for the 
conduct of monetary policy and whether they are available in a downloadable format at the 
bank‘s website. According to CBT-IT, a perfect score is attained if all series used in producing 
the MPR are published in a downloadable format, such as an Excel spreadsheet. These include at 
least the seven series (capacity utilization (preferably the output gap), inflation, inflation 
expectations, wages, unemployment, and GDP growth).  However, the score becomes 0.5 if a 
minimal set of the aforementioned series is publicly available and zero score when none of the 
series is available.  We find that BOG recently publishes a summary of Economic and Financial 
Dataset (SEFD, including inflation, inflation expectation, GDP, monetary and financial dataset, 
fiscal data, etc.) after each press briefings. We find, however, that BOG does not published 
output gap, wages and unemployment data in any of its bulletin or press releases or monetary 
policy reports. Consequently, we score 0.5 for BOG in the first dimension of Category B. 
Besides, the subsequent question (B2) relates to the public availability of core quarterly 
projection model and its documentation updated within the last 5 years. We find that although 
the FPAS model is used by BOG for policy forecasting and analysis, this is not made easily 
accessible to the general public. In this case, a zero (0/1) score is given to BOG for question B2. 
Similar BOG attained a zero score for the question (B3) of how transparent is the central bank 
regarding its reaction function (loss function). This is because there is currently no 
documentation on policy reaction function for BOG nor any reference made in the press release 
or monetary policy report to a publication of that sort. Questions 4-6 of Category B also focus on 
(i) central bank‘s regular publication of a consistent endogenous-instrument (e.g., policy rate) in 
its FPAS over a horizon of at least two years, (ii) the provision of forecast densities (fan charts) 
to communicate forecast uncertainty and (iii) whether the underlying methodology for the 
                                                          
13
 Available at: https://www.bog.gov.gh/supervision-a-regulation/financial-laws 
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construction of the forecast densities is available to the public respectively. According to Al-
Mashat et al. (2018), a perfect score is given if the bank publishes the variables such as inflation, 
GDP growth, the endogenous interest rate path, the output gap, and the exchange rate in 
questions 4 and 5 (i.e. . Each variable has a weight of 0.2. For question B6, however, a perfect 
score is obtained if the methodology of fan charts published in all monetary policy reports is 
clearly explained and/or the links to a technical paper is provided. A review of the bank‘s 
website however unveils that (1) no quarterly forecasts of any for the macroeconomic variables 
are published by BOG in the case of B4; (2) only a fan chart of inflation with trajectory up to two 
years is published in a form of fan chart in the monetary policy report of BOG14 (i.e. score 0.2 
for B5); and (3) BOG does not explain the underlying methodology for constructing the fan chart 
(for B6). As a result, we assign a total score of 0.2/3 to BOG for these three dimensions of 
Category B4-B6.  
 
The dimension 7 of Category B (i.e. B7) determines whether forecast revisions are made 
available to general public. The detailed decomposition of forecast changes (of all the key policy 
variables) vis-à-vis the previous forecast is not published. We however identify mixed results as 
the press statement normally provides upside and downside risks to forecast revisions (inflation 
and output growth) but there is no such information provided regularly to the public for other 
policy variables like exchange rate, endogenous interest rate output gap. For instance, Paragraph 
23 of the November 2018 MPC Press Statement reads:  
“Ladies and Gentlemen, although inflation is forecasted to remain within the medium-term target band, the 
latest assessment shows that there are underlying pressures including risks from the continuing escalating global 
trade tensions, steady rise in global inflation, further hikes in US interest rates, and a stronger US dollar. On the 
downside, the recent significant decline in crude oil prices since mid-October 2018 by about 24 percent could lower 
ex-pump prices, and help moderate the risks going forward.”15 
We therefore assign a score of 0.4/1 for BOG in the case of B.  
 
The next question in Category B (i.e. B2) ascertains the central bank publishes alternative 
scenarios in the monetary policy reports to illustrate key risk(s) in the baseline forecast. We 
notice that although no alternative forecast scenario(s) is (are) published graphically to the 
public, the monetary policy report (MPR) however communicates the imminent risks to the 
baseline forecast. All the same, the risks are just communicated in the MPR without 
accompanying forecast output(s) and hence the public cannot easily evaluate the risks by 
themselves. In this case, BOG has a zero (0) score. For dimension 9, the Category B determines 
whether the monetary policy reports include historical data and forecasts for financial variables. 
According to Al-Mashat et al (2018), financial variables include long-term government bond 
yields, consumer lending rates, mortgage rates, equity prices, property prices, credit aggregates, 
corporate risky spreads (e.g., BAA-AAA bond yields), and credit standards (e.g., loan officer 
                                                          
14
 Available at: https://www.bog.gov.gh/monetary_policy_rpts/ 
15Source:https://www.bog.gov.gh/privatecontent/MPC_Press_Releases/MPC%20Press%20Release%20-
%20November%202018.pdf 
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surveys). In this case, a perfect score is attained if historical data on 5 or more policy variables 
are available, and forecasts for 5 or more of the policy variables are available. A thorough review 
of the bank‘s website shows there is no forecast series for the above financial variables. In 
addition, the summary of economic and financial dataset reports the historical series for long-
term government bond yields, consumer lending rates, equity prices and credit aggregates16.  
More so, the survey on credit aggregates and standards are reported in the Banking Sector report 
although the historical data is unavailable to the general public but could be obtained from the 
BOG upon request. This report can be assessed at https://www.bog.gov.gh/banking_sect_report/. 
In this case, we gave BOG a score of 0.5/1 because a few number of observed financial datasets 
is made available to the general public. In sum, total score for BOG in Category B of CBT-IT 
transparency measure is 1.8/9, which suggests that BOG ought to significantly improve the 
transparency of its policy analysis and forecasting framework. 
 
In the case of Category C, CBT-IT‘s transparency about policy process (TPP) has seven (7) 
dimensions. Notably, first question (C1) of Category C determines whether the central bank 
publishes press statement immediately following the policy decisions. According CBT-IT, a 
perfect score to this question is attained (1/1) if the press statement is published in English 
immediately following the policy decisions. If it is however published in a native language only, 
the score is 1/2. In this regard, we gave a perfect score (i.e. 1/1) to BOG as press release or 
statement is always published immediately following the policy decision at the press conference. 
The press statement is readily available at the Bank‘s website and in English language. It is 
easily accessible at https://www.bog.gov.gh/monetary-policy/press-releases. The second question 
(C2) of this category also scores the institution if its policy decision is explained at a press 
conference immediately after it is announced and there are presentations available in English. In 
this case, a perfect score is given if after all policy meetings, at pre-announced dates and times, 
the press conference with the Q&A session is webcasted and the recording is then made 
available on the website. After thorough review of the routine processes during the time of 
monetary policy meeting, we gave a perfect score of 1/1 to BOG. This is because the interest rate 
decisions are announced at a pre-determined date after all policy meetings and the reasons 
underpinning such policy directions are adequately explained during the press briefing. In 
addition, a section of the press briefing is rather telecasted while downloadable forms of both the 
press releases and the transcripts of the MPC press briefing are made publicly available at the 
Bank‘s website in English17. The next question (C3) ascertain whether the central bank presents 
its regular forecast updates with the Q&A session to journalists, analysts, and market 
participants. A perfect score is given if the response is affirmative and the presentation and Q&A 
are available in English. We find that BOG only meets the press immediate after rate decisions. 
There is however intermittent meetings with investors and market analysts but deliberations of 
                                                          
16This information can be found at: https://www.bog.gov.gh/monetary-policy/press-releases/3871-summary-of-
economic-and-financial-data-november-2018 
17
 This information is readily available at https://www.bog.gov.gh/mpc_press_release/. 
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such meetings are not made available to the general public. Consequently, we gave a score of 0/1 
to BOG for C3 as there is no evidence or public knowledge of such regular forecast updates with 
the Q&A session to journalists, analysts, and market participants.  
 
For question 4 in Category C (i.e. C4), the CBT-IT focuses on the publication of policy 
deliberations (―minutes‖) in less than one month after the meeting. This question seeks to 
determine whether policy decisions are made by a (i) monetary policy committee (MPC) or (ii) 
single policymaker. Also, a perfect score is assigned if the response is affirmative for either (i) or 
(ii) along with detailed contributions by individual MPC members as well as the voting results 
on the main policy instrument. In this regard, although policy decisions are BOG is based on 
consensus, there is no evidence of publication of the minutes of the policy deliberations with 
detailed voting records of each member of MPC at the website. Consequently, our score for 
BOG in C4 is 0/2. The fifth dimension of Category C (i.e. C5) however investigates whether the 
role of staff and policymakers in the baseline forecast process communicated clearly. In this 
instance, if the ownership of the forecast and its role in the decision-making process is defined 
clearly, a perfect is assigned. The score is however zero if the response to C5 is negative.  Upon 
enquiries, we find that although the forecast is the key, it is not the only input to monetary policy 
decision-making at BOG. Staff level meeting precede every pre-MPC and MPC meetings to 
discuss the current forecast and macroeconomic developments and risks to the forecast. As a 
result, we assign a score 1/1 for BOG in the case of C5. The ensuing question (C6) of Category 
C explores the forecasting performance of the central bank reviewed at least once a year in the 
monetary policy reports or in a separate document. A thorough search on the Bank‘s website 
points to no publication of regular review of forecasting performance in the monetary policy 
report or in any official documents, even though such exercise could be in-house. Due to lack of 
documentation and publicity of such exercise, we therefore gave a score of 0/1 for BOG 
regarding C6.  
 
For the last dimension of Category C (i.e. C7), the CBT-IT focuses on the last time the central 
bank or the government held or invited an external evaluation of the policy framework and the 
FPAS, and whether the results were made publicly available. The staffs of International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) visit the BOG on routine missions under the Ghana/IMF programs or on 
special request (assistance) to assist and evaluate the policy framework. Their findings and 
recommendations are usually included in their communiqué for the missions. For instance, Ms. 
Annalisa Fedelino, the lead of the IMF team that visited Ghana from June 20-26, 2018 concluded 
that: ―The monetary policy stance remains appropriate and inflation is expected to continue 
to decline to the 8 percent target before the end of the year. Responding to the gradual lowering 
of the monetary policy rate, lending rates have also been inching down. Recent exchange rate 
pressures are expected to be short-lived, provided that fiscal consolidation continues. A key 
priority is to strengthen foreign exchange (FX) management to help foster a deeper and more 
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liquid FX market.‖18 However, since a somewhat partial report on the evaluation of the policy 
framework or FPAS is provided to general public, we assign a score of 0.5/1 for BOG in this 
category of question. So, total score of Category C for BOG is 3.5/7, implying the need for rapid 
improvement in TPP by BOG.  
 
Our analysis identify that out of 20 questions based on the three broad categories of CBT-IT 
index, BOG had a transparency score of 8.3, indicating a moderate degree of monetary policy 
transparency in Ghana. We check the robustness of our score by further estimating the 
transparency index for BOG using the DE-EG methodology.  
 
4.2 Transparency Index for Bank of Ghana: DE-EG Approach  
 
The DE-EG measure of central bank transparency focuses on five thematic areas: Political, 
Economic, Procedural, Policy and Operations (henceforth, PEPPO). Appendix B presents the 
various questions for PEPPO transparency with DE-EG score and our corresponding scores for 
the extent of BOG transparency. Similarly, our score for BOG is based on the information 
provided at the Bank‘s website and statutes, annual reports, other published documents and the 
routine procedures during and after MPC meetings. On the whole, we find the Bank to perform 
creditably well as it has higher score for transparency index in 3 out of 5 thematic areas based on 
DE-EG approach. Particularly, the Bank performs well in Political and Policy Transparency 
measures with perfect score of 3/3 each. Also, the score for the Bank‘s Operational Transparency 
is quite     high as well (scored 2/3). In contrast, the Bank performed very poor in both Economic 
and Procedural Transparency measures with values of 0.5/3 and 0/3 respectively. The assessment 
of the score reveals a weak policy adherence to procedural and economic transparency. On 
aggregate, we find an overall DE-EG transparency score of 8.5 out of 15 for Bank of Ghana, 
indicating 57.5% degree of monetary policy transparency in Ghana as at end 2018. This 
compares with a score of 5.5 (36.7%) reported by Nascodi et al., (2016) for the year 2009.  
 
4.3 Discussion of results 
 
Generally, it is clearly apparent that CBT-IT score for BOG does not deviate significantly from 
corresponding value from DE-EG measure. The two transparency measures (DE and CBT-IT) 
thus surmise that BOG currently has a policy transparency score of 8.3 - 8.5, indicating that 
BOG is 41.0% -57.5% transparent in its current policy regime. In contrast, Al-Mashat et al. 
(2018) derived a transparency score of 14.5 out of 15 and 11.5 out of 20 for the Czech National 
Bank based on the D-E and CBT-IT measures respectively. According to the CBT-IT approach, 
the relatively moderate score for BOG emanated largely from low level of transparency about the 
FPAS and policy processes and this is consistent with the poor performance of BOG within the 
Economic and Procedural thematic areas under the DE index.  
 
                                                          
18
 Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/06/26/pr18256-imf-staff-concludes-visit-to-ghana 
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The two transparency measures for BOG clearly suggest that several areas of policy 
communication need to be improved in order to boost transparency, and hence the effectiveness 
and credibility of the current monetary policy regime. Notably, increased transparency by BOG 
is required in the: (1) documentation and publication of the Bank‘s core quarterly projection 
model (FPAS) with key equations (especially the loss function); (2) provision of more 
information about how the BOG is dealing with the short-run sacrifice ratio (i.e. tradeoffs 
between output and inflation); (3) public access to the minutes from the MPC meetings with 
more detailed contributions by MPC members; (4) evaluating and publishing how each decision 
on policy instrument or target are attained; (5) Besides the fan chart for inflation that is regularly 
published in the monetary policy report, BOG should also consider publishing other core 
macroeconomic variables that are included in their baseline forecasts with confidence bands, risk 
assessments, and decomposition of forecast revisions; (6) the underlying methodology for 
constructing the forecast confidence bands should be clearly explained; (7) Regular review of 
forecasting performance of the central bank and made accessible to the public; (8) Continuous 
external evaluation of the policy framework and the FPAS at least every 5 years even when not 
under IMF program, and publishing the findings.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Greater policy transparency is broadly inevitable as monetary policy necessitates a dual role by 
central banks. This is because a central bank must not only be a heedful observer of outcomes 
but also be able to shape the outcomes. In addition, greater policy transparency has not been 
linked to policy accountability but also endorsed a medium to boost monetary policy credibility, 
effectiveness and flexibility. As a consequent, this study determines the degree of monetary 
policy transparency in Ghana following over decade practice of inflation targeting regime. In this 
regard, we employ the methodologies proposed by both DE and CBT-IT. Prior to that, we assess 
the institutional and structural framework of Bank of Ghana (BOG) vis-à-vis the tenets of 
inflation targeting regime with regards to clarity of policy objective, extent of central bank 
independence and policy accountability and transparency. 
 
The following observations are worth mentioning. We uncover that the legal framework for the 
BOG operations (such as clarity in policy objective, central bank independence, etc.) is 
consistent with the IT tenet. Our analysis also reveals that DE method yields a transparency 
index of 8.5 out of 15 points while the CBT-IT gives 8.3 out of 20 points for Bank of Ghana as at 
mid-2019. Both measures robustly imply a moderate degree of monetary policy transparency in 
Ghana ranging between 41% and 57%. Compared to the estimate of 5.5 (37%) for 2009 by 
Naszodi et al (2016), our estimates strongly suggest that monetary policy transparency has 
certainly improved since 2009. 
 
Yet, the two transparency measures clearly suggest that several areas of policy communication 
need to be improved by BOG in order to boost transparency, and hence effectiveness and 
Measuring monetary policy transparency index for Ghana                                                        2019 
 
21 | P a g e  
 
credibility of the current monetary policy regime. Particularly, the area that required significant 
attention by BOG in order to boost it policy transparency are: (1) documentation and publication 
of the Bank‘s core quarterly projection model (FPAS) with key equations (especially the loss 
function); (2) provision of more information about how the BOG is dealing with the short-run 
sacrifice ratio (i.e. tradeoffs between output and inflation); (3) public access to the minutes from 
the MPC meetings with more detailed contributions by MPC members; (4) evaluating and 
publishing how each decision on policy instrument or target are attained; (5) Besides the fan 
chart for inflation that is regularly published in the monetary policy report, BOG should also 
consider publishing other core macroeconomic variables that are included in their baseline 
forecasts with confidence bands, risk assessments, and decomposition of forecast revisions; (6) 
the underlying methodology for constructing the forecast confidence bands should be clearly 
explained; (7) Regular review of forecasting performance of the central bank and made 
accessible to the public; (8) Continuous external evaluation of the policy framework and the 
FPAS at least every 5 years even when not under IMF program, and publishing the findings.  
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Appendix A: 
Application and Determination of CBT-IT Transparency question and score for Bank 
of Ghana 
This section applies the CBT-IT questions to the Bank of Ghana (BOG) in 2018 and the scores BOG 
at 8.3 out of 20. This indicates a low transparency score of 41%. 
 
Category A: Transparency about Objectives 
A1. Is there a formal statement of the objectives of monetary policy emphasizing the dual 
mandate (or multiple objectives), and that inflation is the primary objective? Is it easily 
accessible on the central bank’s website? 
Single inflation objective or multiple policy objectives without prioritization 0.0 
Inflation as the primary objective such that any other objective (output, etc.) cannot be 
inconsistent with the primary objective of anchoring inflation and inflation expectations.       
1.0 
BOG score: 1/1 
 
A2. Is the inflation target defined clearly? 
No medium-term numerical target over a horizon of 2-3 years or more (hereafter medium term). 0.0 
Inflation target defined as a ―tolerance‖ or ―control range‖ target.  
Inflation target defined as a medium-term target, however, the meaning of the range or the band 
is not clear.                                                                         
0.5 
Inflation target defined as a well-defined point target. If a band is used, it is clearly 
communicated.                                                                                                            
1.0 
BOG score: 1/1 
 
A3. Might financial stability objectives override the primacy of the inflation (price stability) 
objective? If the central bank does not have a financial stability responsibility, it should be 
explicit that it uses the policy interest rate tool to affect financial conditions to the extent that it 
affects the output gap and hence achieving the inflation target. 
(i) Another institution is responsible for financial stability.  
Central bank cares about financial stability to the extent that it affects stabilization objectives 
(output and unemployment), but it is unclear that inflation is the primary objective. 
0.0 
Central bank cares about financial stability to the extent that it affects stabilization objectives 
(output and unemployment), and makes it clear that inflation is the primary objective.       
1.0 
BOG score: 1/1 
 
(ii) Central bank is at least partly responsible for financial stability.  
The borderlines between the monetary policy and financial stability tools are unclear.  This 
creates confusion about the primary objective of price stability.                                     
0.0 
The central bank has both monetary policy and macro-prudential tools and it is clear how the 
central bank adjusts its tools to achieve its monetary policy and financial stability objectives. 
1.0 
BOG score: 1/1 
 
A4. Does the central bank use a loss function evaluation to show how well it has been doing in 
managing the short-run output-inflation tradeoff? 
No. 0.0 
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Yes. 1.0 
Perfect score requires: the central bank should publish the values of the loss function and represent 
them in a chart. 
BOG score: 0/1 
BOG’s Total Score for Category A =3/4 
 
Category B: Transparency about the FPAS 
 B1. Are the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy publicly available in 
a downloadable format from the central bank’s website (could also include links to other statistical 
agencies)? For example, data reported in the monetary policy reports should be made available on 
the website.  
No database is publicly available 0.0 
A minimal set of series is publicly available, output gap or other ways of measuring capacity 
utilization, inflation, inflation expectations, wages, unemployment, and GDP.  
0.5 
All series used in producing the MPR are published in a downloadable format, such as an Excel 
spreadsheet. These series include at least the seven series above (capacity utilization (preferably 
the output gap), inflation, inflation expectations, wages, unemployment, and GDP).      
1.0 
BOG score: 0.5/1 
 
B2. Is the core quarterly projection model (model used for policy-making) publicly available and 
documentation updated within the last 5 years?  
No 0.00 
Yes, in a ―working paper‖ format only, i.e., irreproducible 0.25 
Yes, in a working paper and with code. 0.50 
Yes, in a working paper, with code, and web-based front-end to modify forecast assumptions. 1.00 
BOG score: 0/1 
 
B3. How transparent is the central bank about the reaction functions (or loss functions) that are 
used to compute the interest rate paths (or paths for other instruments when the policy rate is 
constrained by the ELB) in their regular projection exercises? Do the monetary policy reports 
include a reference to the core model documentation that has the reaction function or the loss 
function?  
The central bank does not publish either the reaction function or the loss function.  0.0 
The central bank publishes the reaction function and/or loss function (with the coefficients) in an 
easily accessible place on the central bank‘s website. 
1.0 
BOG score: 0/1 
 
B4. For what variables does the central bank publish a consistent endogenous-instrument (e.g., 
policy rate) quarterly macroeconomic projection over a horizon of at least two years?  
None. 0.0 
Inflation. 0.2 
Inflation and GDP growth.  0.4 
Inflation, GDP growth, and the endogenous interest rate path.  0.6 
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Inflation, GDP growth, the endogenous interest rate path, and the output gap. 0.8 
Inflation, GDP growth, the endogenous interest rate path, the output gap, and the exchange rate. 1.0 
BOG score: 0/1. No forecast of the variables is published 
 
B5. Does the central bank regularly publish forecast densities (fan charts) to communicate forecast 
uncertainty?  
No fan charts. 0.0 
Fan chart for inflation. 0.2 
Fan charts for inflation and GDP growth. 0.4 
Fan charts for inflation, GDP growth, and the endogenous interest rate path.  0.6 
Fan charts for inflation, GDP growth, the endogenous interest rate path, and the output gap.  0.8 
Fan charts for inflation, GDP growth, the endogenous interest rate path, the output gap, and the exchange rate. 1.0 
BOG score: 0.2/1. Only Fan chart for inflation is published 
B6. Is the underlying methodology constructing the forecast densities (fan charts) clear and easily accessible?  
For example, do the regularly published forecast densities (fan charts) reflect (i) monetary policy reaction to 
shocks (model-based stochastic simulations); (ii) historic experience (past forecast errors); (iii) judgment (e.g., 
magnitude of structural shocks versus measurement errors); and (iv) other constraints (e.g., effective lower 
bound)?  
No fan chart or the fan chart methodology is not explained.  0.0 
Fan charts published in all monetary policy reports and the methodology is clearly explained and/or links to 
a technical paper is provided. 
1.0 
BOG Score: 0/1.  
 
B7. Does the central bank regularly publish an assessment of forecast revisions (decomposition of forecast 
changes vis-à-vis the previous forecast)? 
No 0.0 
For inflation only with a discussion of the underlying causes.  0.2 
For inflation and GDP growth with a discussion of the underlying causes. 0.4 
For inflation, GDP growth, and the endogenous interest rate path with a discussion of the underlying causes.  0.6 
For inflation, GDP growth, the endogenous interest rate path, and the output gap with a discussion the 
underlying causes.  
0.8 
For inflation, GDP growth, the endogenous interest rate path, the output gap, and the exchange rate with a 
discussion the underlying causes. 
1.0 
BOG score: 0.2/1 
B8. Does the central bank publish alternative scenarios in their monetary policy reports to illustrate key 
risk(s) in the baseline forecast?  
No alternative scenario.  0.0  
The major risk(s) is communicated in an alternative scenario(s).  1.0  
BOG score: 0/1 
B9. Do the monetary policy reports include historical data and forecasts for financial variables? Financial 
variables include long-term government bond yields, consumer lending rates, mortgage rates, equity prices, 
property prices, credit aggregates, corporate risky spreads (e.g., BAA-AAA bond yields), and credit standards 
(e.g., loan officer surveys). All data should be available in downloadable format.  
No data or forecast of financial variables is available.   0.0  
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Historical data on less than 5 of the above variables are available, and forecasts for less than 5 of the 
above variables are available.  
0.1-0.9*  
Historical data on 5 or more of the above variables are available, and forecasts for 5 or more of the 
above variables are available.  
1.0  
* For historical series, the central bank would be awarded 0.1 for each type of financial variables up  
to a maximum of 0.5. For forecast series, the central bank would be awarded 0.1 for each type of  
financial variables up to a maximum of 0.5. 
BOG score: 0.5/1 
BOG’s total score for Category B: 1.8/9 
 
Category C: Transparency about Policy Process  
C1. Does the central bank publish a press statement immediately following the policy decisions?  
The central bank does not publish a press statement immediately after the policy decisions.  0.0  
The central bank publishes press statements in the native language only.  0.5  
The central bank publishes press statements in English.  1.0  
BOG score: 1/1 
 
 
 
C2. Is the policy decision explained at a press conference immediately after it is announced? Are 
the presentations available in English?  
No 0.0  
Yes, after all policy meetings, at pre-announced dates and times. The press conference with the 
Q&A session is webcasted and the recording is then made available on the website. The 
presentations are available in downloadable form only in the native language.  
0.5  
Yes, after all policy meetings, at pre-announced dates and times. The press conference with the 
Q&A session is webcasted and the recording is then made available on the website.  
The presentations are available in downloadable form in English 
1.0 
BOG score: 1/1 
 
C3. Does the central bank present its regular forecast updates with the Q&A session to 
journalists, analysts, and market participants? Are the presentations available in English?  
No.  0.0  
Yes. The presentation and Q&A are available only in the native language.  0.5  
Yes. The presentation and Q&A are available in English.  1.0  
BOG score: 0/1 
 
C4. Is there a public account of the policy deliberations (“minutes”) published in less than one 
month after the meeting?  
(i) when policy decisions are made by a monetary policy committee  
No.  0.00  
Yes, but condensed, non-attributed, and without voting results.  0.50  
Yes, detailed and with voting results on the main policy instrument. Contributions by 
individual MPC members and votes are not attributed.  
0.75  
Yes, detailed and with voting results on the main policy instrument. Contributions by 
individual MPC members and votes are attributed.  
1.00  
BOG score: 0/1 
 
(ii) when policy decisions are made by a single policymaker 
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No.  0.00  
Yes, with arguments/explanations.      1.00  
BOG score: 0/1 
 
 
C5. Is the role of staff and policymakers in the baseline forecast process communicated clearly? 
No. It is not clear how the forecast is constructed and is used in the decision-making process. 0.0 
Yes. The ownership of the forecast and its role in the decision-making process is defined      
clearly.                                          
1.0 
BOG Score: 1/1 
 
C6. Is the forecasting performance of the central bank reviewed at least once a year in the monetary policy 
reports or in a separate document? 
No 0.0 
Yes 1.0 
BOG Score: 0/1 
 
C7. When was the last time the central bank or the government held or invited an external evaluation of 
the policy framework and the FPAS, and made the results publicly available? 
No evaluation in last 5 years 0.0 
Either policy framework or FPAS evaluation in the last 5 years.    0.5 
Both policy framework and FPAS evaluation in the last 5 years.    1.0 
BOG Score: 0.5/1 
BOG’s Total Score for Category C: 3.5/7 
Overall BOG’s Transparency Score is: 8.3/20 == 41.0% 
Appendix B 
Application of Dincer-Eichengreen (DE) Central Bank Transparency Questions 
and Scores for Bank of Ghana 
This section applies the DE (2014) transparency questions to the Bank of Ghana (BOG) in 2018 
and the scores BOG at 8.5 out of 15. This indicates a moderate transparency score of 56.7% 
1. Political Transparency 
 Questions D-E 
Score 
BOG 
Score 
(a) Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an explicit 
prioritization in case of multiple objectives?  
 
i. No formal objective(s)   0  
ii. Multiple objectives without prioritization.  1/2  
iii. One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority. 1 1 
(b) Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)?   
i. No   0  
ii. Yes   1 1 
(c) Are there explicit contacts or other similar institutional arrangements between the 
monetary authorities and the government?  
 
i. No central bank contracts or other institutional arrangements   0  
ii. Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract   1/2  
iii. Central bank with explicit instrument independence or central bank contract although 
possibly subject to an explicit override procedure  
1 1 
 
2. Economic Transparency 
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 Questions D-E 
Score 
BOG 
Score 
(a) Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy publicly 
available? (The focus is on the following five variables: money supply, inflation, 
GDP, unemployment rate and capacity utilization.)  
 
i. Quarterly time series for at most two out of the five variables  0  
ii. Quarterly time series for three or four out of the five variables  1/2 1/2 
iii. Quarterly time series for all five variables  1  
(b) Does the central bank disclose the macroeconomic model(s) it uses for policy 
analysis?  
 
i. No  0 0 
ii. Yes   1  
(c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts?   
i. No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output  0 0 
ii. Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and/or output published at less than 
quarterly frequency  
1/2  
iii. Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output for the medium term 
(one to two years ahead), specifying the assumptions about the policy instrument 
(conditional or unconditional forecasts)  
1  
 
3. Procedural Transparency 
 Questions DE 
Score 
BOG 
Score 
(a) Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its 
monetary policy framework?  
 
i. No  0 0 
ii. Yes  1  
(b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberations (or 
explanations in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of time?  
 
i. No or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks)  0 0 
ii. Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed) or 
explanations (in case of a single central banker), including a discussion of backward- and 
forward-looking arguments. 
1 
 
(c) Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main operating 
instrument or target was reached?  
 
i. No or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks).  0 0 
ii. Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed) or 
explanations (in case of a single central banker), including a discussion of backward- and 
forward-looking arguments. 
1  
  
4. Policy Transparency 
 Questions DE 
Score 
BOG 
Score 
(a) Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target 
announced promptly?  
 
i. No or only after the day of implementation  0  
ii. Yes, on the day of implementation  1 1 
(b) Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy decisions?   
i. No  0  
ii. Yes, when policy decisions change, or only superficially  1/2  
iii. Yes, always and including forwarding-looking assessments  1 1 
(c) Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy meeting 
or an explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least quarterly)?  
 
i. No  0  
ii. Yes  1 1 
Measuring monetary policy transparency index for Ghana                                                        2019 
 
31 | P a g e  
 
 
5. Operational Transparency 
 Questions DE 
Score 
BOG 
Score 
(a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy operating 
targets (if any) have been achieved?  
 
i. No or not very often (at less than annual frequency)   0  
ii. Yes but without providing explanations for significant deviations   1/2  
iii. Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target (if any); or, (nearly) perfect control 
over main operating instrument/target   
1 1 
(b) Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated) macroeconomic 
disturbances that affect the policy transmission process?  
 
i. No or not very often.  0  
ii. Yes but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroeconomic 
developments (at least quarterly)   
1/2 1/2 
iii. Yes, including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least annually)   1  
(c) Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome in light of 
its macroeconomic objectives?  
 
i. No or not very often (at less than annual frequency)   0  
ii. Yes but superficially   1/2 1/2 
iii. Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary policy in meeting the objectives  1  
 
The Overall BOG’s score for DE Transparency Index is 8.5/15 = 56.7%, indicating a moderate 
degree of monetary policy transparency in Ghana. The assessment of the score particularly reveals 
a weak policy adherence to procedural and economic transparency.  
 
 
